Eternalism and death's badness

In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry Silverstein (eds.), Time and Identity. MIT Press (2010)
Abstract
This chapter discusses the metaphysical view referred to by Harry Silverstein as “four-dimensionalism,” but referred to in this chapter as “eternalism.” In contrast to presentism, eternalism posits that purely past and purely future objects and events exist. If a person goes out of existence at the moment of death, the problem arises as to how death is bad for its victim. According to Silverstein, this problem arises from the truth of the “Values Connect with Feelings” thesis, according to which it must be possible for someone to have feelings about a thing in order for that thing to be bad for that person. The badness of death may entail eternalism, but it is for an entirely different reason. Eternalism must be true in order for there to be a time at which death is bad for its victim. These two conflicting views are discussed in this chapter.
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DOI 10.7551/mitpress/9780262014090.003.0190
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Mikel Burley (2008). Harry Silverstein's Four-Dimensionalism and the Purported Evil of Death. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (4):559 – 568.

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