Explanatory and non-explanatory goals in the social sciences: A reply to Reiss

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 38 (2):271-278 (2008)
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Abstract

The paper has three aims. First, to show that Julian Reiss' critique of what he calls the New Mechanist Perspective in the social sciences is built on a number of misconceptions; second, to provide some arguments for the need of reflections and discussions about common and "ultimate" goals for the social sciences; and third, to suggest a focus on mechanisms as one such viable goal. Key Words: social science • goals • explanations • mechanisms.

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Citations of this work

The Structure of Causal Chains.Neil Gross - 2018 - Sociological Theory 36 (4):343-367.

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References found in this work

Do we need mechanisms in the social sciences?Julian Reiss - 2007 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 37 (2):163-184.
Consequences of realism for sociological theory-building.Thomas Brante - 2001 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 31 (2):167–195.
With or Without Mechanisms: A Reply to Weber.Daniel Steel - 2007 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 37 (3):360-365.

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