Functionalism and The Independence Problems

Noûs 47 (1):545-557 (2013)
Abstract
The independence problems for functionalism stem from the worry that if functional properties are defined in terms of their causes and effects then such functional properties seem to be too intimately connected to these purported causes and effects. I distinguish three different ways the independence problems can be filled out – in terms of necessary connections, analytic connections and vacuous explanations. I argue that none of these present serious problems. Instead, they bring out some important and over-looked features of functionalism.
Keywords Functionalism  Explanation  Necessity  Analyticity  Causation
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Louise M. Antony & Joseph Levine (1997). Reduction with Autonomy. Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):83-105.

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