David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Noûs 47 (1):545-557 (2013)
The independence problems for functionalism stem from the worry that if functional properties are defined in terms of their causes and effects then such functional properties seem to be too intimately connected to these purported causes and effects. I distinguish three different ways the independence problems can be filled out – in terms of necessary connections, analytic connections and vacuous explanations. I argue that none of these present serious problems. Instead, they bring out some important and over-looked features of functionalism.
|Keywords||Functionalism Explanation Necessity Analyticity Causation|
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Citations of this work BETA
Elmar Unnsteinsson (2014). Compositionality and Sandbag Semantics. Synthese 191 (14):3329-3350.
Robert D. Rupert (2014). Necessity Is Unnecessary: A Response to Bradley. Noûs 48 (3):558-564.
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