Four Problems about Self-Locating Belief
Philosophical Review 121 (2):149-177 (2012)
| Abstract | I argue that four problems that appear to be very different have the same structure. I give a unified treatment of the Doomsday Argument, Sleeping Beauty, the Fine-tuning Argument and confirmation in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. All these cases involve self-locating evidence. However, the confusing feature of all these cases is not self-location, but observation selection effects. I explain how observation selection effects operate, why they affect the four problem cases, and how they can be incorporated into confirmation theory. I will defend the Doomsday Argument, the halfer position in Sleeping Beauty, the Fine-tuning Argument and the applicability of confirmation theory to the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesDaniel Peterson (2011). Qeauty and the Books: A Response to Lewis's Quantum Sleeping Beauty Problem. Synthese 181 (3):367-374.
Brian Kierland & Bradley Monton (2005). Minimizing Inaccuracy for Self-Locating Beliefs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):384-395.
Peter J. Lewis (2007). Quantum Sleeping Beauty. Analysis 67 (293):59-65.
Darren Bradley (2011). Confirmation in a Branching World: The Everett Interpretation and Sleeping Beauty. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):323-342.
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