Four Problems about Self-Locating Belief

Philosophical Review 121 (2):149-177 (2012)
This article defends the Doomsday Argument, the Halfer Position in Sleeping Beauty, the Fine-Tuning Argument, and the applicability of Bayesian confirmation theory to the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. It will argue that all four problems have the same structure, and it gives a unified treatment that uses simple models of the cases and no controversial assumptions about confirmation or self-locating evidence. The article will argue that the troublesome feature of all these cases is not self-location but selection effects.
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DOI 10.1215/00318108-1539071
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PhilPapers Archive D. J. Bradley, Four Problems about Self-Locating Belief
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Emily Adlam (2014). The Problem of Confirmation in the Everett Interpretation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 47:21-32.
Darren Bradley (2015). Everettian Confirmation and Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Wilson. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (3):683-693.

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