How bad is death?

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):111-127 (2007)
A popular view about why death is bad for the one who dies is that death deprives its subject of the good things in life. This is the “deprivation account” of the evil of death. There is another view about death that seems incompatible with the deprivation account: the view that a person’s death is less bad if she has lived a good life. In The Ethics of Killing, Jeff McMahan argues that a deprivation account should discount the evil of death for previous gains in life. I argue against discounting evils, and show how a version of the deprivation view can accommodate McMahan’s examples
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DOI 10.1353/cjp.2007.0007
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