In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press (2009)
|Abstract||Two approaches to instrumental rationality Suppose I intend end E, believe that a necessary means to E is M, and believe that M requires that I intend M. My attitudes concerning E and M engage a basic requirement of practical rationality, a requirement that, barring a change in my cited beliefs, I either intend M or give up intending E.2 Call this the Instrumental Rationality requirement – for short, the IR requirement.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Thomas Kelly (2003). Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.
Ralph Wedgwood (2011). Instrumental Rationality. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:280-309.
Thomas Kelly (2007). Evidence and Normativity: Reply to Leite. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):465–474.
Markos Valaris (2012). Instrumental Rationality. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4).
Allen Coates (2013). The Enkratic Requirement. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):320-333.
John Brunero (2012). Instrumental Rationality, Symmetry and Scope. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):125-140.
Edward Harcourt (2004). Instrumental Desires, Instrumental Rationality. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):111–129.
Bruno Verbeek (2001). Consequentialism, Rationality and the Relevant Description of Outcomes. Economics and Philosophy 17 (2):181-205.
Michael Smith (2004). Instrumental Desires, Instrumental Rationality. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):93–109.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads192 ( #1,886 of 722,863 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #20,385 of 722,863 )
How can I increase my downloads?