In Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason: New Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
|Abstract||In my 1987 book I tried to understand intentions as, in the basic case, elements of larger and typically partial plans whose primary roles in our lives are ones of coordination and organization, both cross-temporal and social.1 I called this the planning theory of intention. Central to the planning theory is the idea that intentions – in contrast with ordinary desires -- are both embedded in characteristic regularities and are subject to distinctive rational pressures for consistency and coherence. There is, in particular, a rational demand that one’s intentions, taken together with one’s beliefs, fit together into a consistent model of one’s future. There is, further, a rational demand that one’s intentions be means-end coherent in the sense, roughly, that it not be true that one intends E, believes that E requires that one intend means M, and yet not intend M.3 And these norms of consistency and coherence are operative in a planning agent’s practical reasoning.|
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