David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Topics 24 (2):1-18 (1996)
I [try] to understand identification by appeal to phenomena of deciding to treat, and of treating, a desire of one's as reason-giving in one's practical reasoning, planning, and action. Is identification, so understood, "fundamental," as Frankfurt says, "to any philosophy of mind and of action"? Well, we have seen reason to include in our model of intentional agency such phenomena of deciding to treat, and of treating, certain of one's desires as reason-giving. Identification, at bottom, consists in such phenomena — or so I have proposed. Given that such phenomena are important in our practical lives, we may agree with Frankfurt that identification is, in this sense, "fundamental.".
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Robert L. Woolfolk, John M. Doris & John M. Darley (2006). Identification, Situational Constraint, and Social Cognition: Studies in the Attribution of Moral Responsibility. Cognition 100 (2):283-301.
John M. Doris, Joshua Knobe & Robert L. Woolfolk (2007). Variantism About Responsibility. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):183–214.
Markus E. Schlosser (2012). Taking Something as a Reason for Action. Philosophical Papers 41 (2):267-304.
Dana K. Nelkin (2005). Freedom, Responsibility and the Challenge of Situationism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):181–206.
Christian Miller (2013). Identifying with Our Desires. Theoria 79 (2):127-154.
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