David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):227-241 (2011)
The practical thought of planning agents is subject to distinctive rationality norms. In particular, there are norms of intention consistency and of means-end coherence. I discuss the normative significance of these norms and their relation to practical reasons. I seek a path between views that see these norms as, at bottom, norms of theoretical rationality, and views that see the idea that these norms have distinctive normative significance as a 'myth'. And I seek to distinguish these norms from principles about the transmission of practical reasons. In the end, my view draws on claims about what is involved in being a self-governing planning agent
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References found in this work BETA
Allan Gibbard (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. Harvard University Press.
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Michael Bratman (1987). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Bernard Arthur Owen Williams (1981). Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers, 1973-1980. Cambridge University Press.
Michael Bratman (2007). Structures of Agency: Essays. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Yair Levy (2015). Normativity and Self-Relations. Philosophical Studies 172 (2):359-374.
Luca Tummolini (2014). Making Our Ends Meet: Shared Intention, Goal Adoption and the Third-Person Perspective. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):75-98.
Bruno Verbeek (2014). On the Normativity of Intentions. Topoi 33 (1):87-101.
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