Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):227-241 (2011)
|Abstract||The practical thought of planning agents is subject to distinctive rationality norms. In particular, there are norms of intention consistency and of means-end coherence. I discuss the normative significance of these norms and their relation to practical reasons. I seek a path between views that see these norms as, at bottom, norms of theoretical rationality, and views that see the idea that these norms have distinctive normative significance as a 'myth'. And I seek to distinguish these norms from principles about the transmission of practical reasons. In the end, my view draws on claims about what is involved in being a self-governing planning agent|
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