Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (Supplement):1-20 (2005)
|Abstract||Kant’s innovative normative characterization of what one is doing in judging is appealed to as the basis of a story about how he moves from an inferential to a representational characterization of the contents of judgment. His normative notion of freedom and his demarcation of the normative in terms of autonomy are connected to his account of the status of modal concepts|
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