Online research in philosophy

One obstacle faced by proposals of retrocausal influences in quantum mechanics is the perceived high conceptual cost of making such a proposal. I assemble here a metaphysical picture consistent with the possibility of retrocausality and not precluded by the known physical structure of our reality. I conclude that given the right mix of some reasonable metaphysical and epistemological ingredients there is no conceptual cost to such a picture.

Consequentialists do not deny that cost to the agent is a morallyrelevant consideration. For, they do include cost to the agent inthe calculation of the overall good. What they deny, however, isthat cost to the agent is a morally relevant factor independentlyof its impact on the overall good. I argue in this paper that, ifone rejects the claim that cost to the agent is a morallyrelevant factor on its own right, one is then committed toaccepting some `hyper' counter-intuitive moral claims. I callthese claims hyper counter-intuitive because they are at a moreextreme level of counter-intuitiveness than the ones usuallyassociated with consequentialism.

Some have attempted to justify benefit/ cost analysis by appealing to a moral theory that appears to directly ground the technique. This approach is unsuccessful because the moral theory in question is wildly implausible and, even if it were correct, it would probably not endorse the unrestricted use of benefit/ cost analysis. Nevertheless, there is reason to think that a carefully restricted use of benefit/ cost analysis will be justifiable from a wide variety of plausible moral perspectives. From this, it is reasonable to conclude that such use of the technique is probably morally justified and should be acceptable to most people.

Accoding to G.E. Moore, something''s intrinsic valuedepends solely on its intrinsic nature. Recently Thomas Hurka andShelly Kagan have argued, contra Moore, that something''s intrinsic valuemay depend on its extrinsic properties. Call this view the ConditionalView of intrinsic value. In this paper I demonstrate how a Mooreancan account for purported counterexamples given by Hurka and Kagan. I thenargue that certain organic unities pose difficulties for the ConditionalView.

In this book, Jerome Kagan takes a provocative look at the mental developments underlying the startling transitions in the child's second year.It is Kagan&...

Most people believe that there are limits to the sacrifices that morality can demand. Although it would often be meritorious, we are not, in fact, morally required to do all that we can to promote overall good. What's more, most people also believe that certain types of acts are simply forgiven, morally off limits, even when necessary for promoting the overall good. In this provocative analysis Kagan maintains that despite the intuitive appeal of these views, they cannot be adequately defended. In criticizing arguments for limited moral requirements as well as those for unconditionally prohibited acts, Kagan offers a sustained attack on two of the most basic features of ordinary common sense morality.