Kripke's Revenge [Book Review]

Philosophical Studies 128 (3):669 - 682 (2006)
Millianism says that the semantic content of a name (or indexical) is simply its referent. This thesis arises within a general, powerful research program, the propositionalist approach to semantics, which sets as a goal for philosophical semantics an assignment of entities – semantic contents – to bits of language, culminating in the assignment of propositions to sentences. Communication, linguistic competence, truth conditions, and other semantic phenomena are ultimately explained in terms of semantic contents.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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DOI 10.2307/4321741
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References found in this work BETA
Saul Kripke (2010). Naming and Necessity. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge 431-433.
Saul A. Kripke (1979). A Puzzle About Belief. In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel 239--83.

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Citations of this work BETA
Jeff Speaks (2011). Frege's Puzzle and Descriptive Enrichment. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):267-282.
Andrea Onofri (2013). On Non-Pragmatic Millianism. Philosophical Studies 166 (2):305-327.

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