Monty hall, doomsday and confirmation
Analysis 63 (277):23–31 (2003)
| Abstract | In sum, then, Chalmers’s attempt to argue against physicalism based on the conceivability of zombies misses the mark. His version of conceivability does indeed imply possibility, but at the cost of making it unclear whether zombies are indeed conceivable | |||||||||
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