Modest sociality and the distinctiveness of intention

Philosophical Studies 144 (1):149 - 165 (2009)
Abstract
Cases of modest sociality are cases of small scale shared intentional agency in the absence of asymmetric authority relations. I seek a conceptual framework that adequately supports our theorizing about such modest sociality. I want to understand what in the world constitutes such modest sociality. I seek an understanding of the kinds of normativity that are central to modest sociality. And throughout we need to keep track of the relations—conceptual, metaphysical, normative—between individual agency and modest sociality. In pursuit of these theoretical aims, I propose that a central phenomenon is shared intention. I argue that an adequate understanding of the distinctiveness of the intentions of individuals allows us to provide a construction of attitudes of the participants, and of relevant inter-relations and contexts that constitutes shared intention. I explain how shared intention, so understood, differs from a simple equilibrium within common knowledge. And I briefly contrast my views with aspects of views of John Searle and Margaret Gilbert
Keywords Modest sociality  Planning theory of intention  Shared intention  Shared agency  Joint action  Margaret Gilbert  John Searle
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.

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Citations of this work BETA
Olle Blomberg (2011). Socially Extended Intentions-in-Action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):335-353.
Elisabeth Pacherie (2011). Framing Joint Action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):173-192.
Frank Hindriks (2013). Collective Acceptance and the Is-Ought Argument. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):465-480.
John Michael (2011). Shared Emotions and Joint Action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):355-373.
Thomas H. Smith (2011). Playing One's Part. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):213-44.

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