More triviality

Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (2):129-139 (1999)
This paper uses the framework of Popper and Miller's work on axiom systems for conditional probabilities to explore Adams' thesis concerning the probabilities of conditionals. It is shown that even very weak axiom systems have only a very restricted set of models satisfying a natural generalisation of Adams' thesis, thereby casting severe doubt on the possibility of developing a non-Boolean semantics for conditionals consistent with it
Keywords Philosophy
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DOI 10.1023/A:1004391701130
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References found in this work BETA
Peter Milne (1997). Bruno de Finetti and the Logic of Conditional Events. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (2):195-232.
Alan Hájek (1989). Probabilities of Conditionals — Revisited. Journal of Philosophical Logic 18 (4):423 - 428.

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Citations of this work BETA
Moritz Schulz (2010). Wondering What Might Be. Philosophical Studies 149 (3):367 - 386.
Richard Bradley (2006). Adams Conditionals and Non-Monotonic Probabilities. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (1-2):65-81.

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