Of colors, kestrels, caterpillars, and leaves

Journal of Philosophy 98 (9):469-487 (2001)
Abstract
According to color realism, object colors are mind-independent properties that cover surfaces or permeate volumes of objects. In recent years, some color scientists and a growing number of philosophers have opposed this view on the grounds that realism about color cannot accommodate the apparent unitary/binary structure of the hues. For example, Larry Hardin asserts, " the unitary-binary structure of the colors as we experience them corresponds to no known physical structure lying outside nervous systems that is causally involved in the perception of color. This makes it very difficult to subscribe to a color realism that is supposed to be about red, green, blue, black, and white—that is, the colors with which we are perceptually acquainted.1 " Similarly, Evan Thompson says
Keywords Color  Perception  Realism  Science
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DOI jphil200198921
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