Graduate studies at Western
Journal Of Philosophy 98 (9):469-487 (2001)
According to color realism, object colors are mind-independent properties that cover surfaces or permeate volumes of objects. In recent years, some color scientists and a growing number of philosophers have opposed this view on the grounds that realism about color cannot accommodate the apparent unitary/binary structure of the hues. For example, Larry Hardin asserts,
the unitary-binary structure of the colors as we experience themSimilarly, Evan Thompson says.
|Keywords||Color Perception Realism Science|
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