Presentism as an Empirical Hypothesis

Philosophy of Science 80 (5):1101-1111 (2014)
Abstract
Within philosophy of physics it is broadly accepted that presentism as an empirical hypothesis has been falsified by the development of special relativity. In this article, I identify and reject an assumption common to both presentists and advocates of the block universe and then offer an alternative version of presentism that does not begin from spatiotemporal structure, which is an empirical hypothesis, and which has yet to be falsified. While some features of familiar presentism are lost, a sufficient core remains to warrant the label (though I fear that labeling it “presentism” dooms the view)
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,018
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Katherine Brading (2013). Three Principles of Unity in Newton. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):408-415.
Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Yuval Dolev (2008). Semantic Externalism and Presentism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (4):533 – 557.
Christian Wuthrich (2012). Demarcating Presentism. In Henk de Regt, Samir Okasha & Stephan Hartmann (eds.), EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. 441--450.
Christian Wuthrich (forthcoming). The Fate of Presentism in Modern Physics. In Roberto Ciuni, Kristie Miller & Giuliano Torrengo (eds.), New Papers on the Present--Focus on Presentism. Philosophia Verlag.
M. Oreste Fiocco (2007). A Defense of Transient Presentism. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (3):191 - 212.
Michael C. Rea (2006). Presentism and Fatalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):511 – 524.
H. Scott Hestevold (2008). Presentism: Through Thick and Thin. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):325-347.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2012-11-11

Total downloads

27 ( #64,127 of 1,101,073 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #81,248 of 1,101,073 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.