Physically locating the present: a case of reading physics as a contribution to philosophy

In this paper I argue that reading history of physics as a contribution to history of philosophy is important for contemporary philosophy of physics. My argument centers around a particular case: special relativity versus presentism. By means of resources drawn from reading aspects of Newton's work as contributions to philosophy, I argue that there is in physics an alternative way to approach what we mean by "present" such that presentism remains an open empirical question whose refutation requires resources that go beyond those of special relativity. I offer this as an example of one fruitful way in which we pursue integrated HPS
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DOI 10.1016/j.shpsa.2014.09.007
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Katherine Brading (2013). Three Principles of Unity in Newton. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):408-415.

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Mauro Dorato (2010). On Various Senses of “Conventional” and Their Interrelation in the Philosophy of Physics: Simultaneity as a Case Study. In Thomas Uebel, Stephan Hartmann, Wenceslao Gonzalez, Marcel Weber, Dennis Dieks & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science. Springer 335--349.

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