David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Studies 105 (1):59 - 105 (2001)
Russellianism (also called `neo-Russellianism, `Millianism, and `thenaive theory') entails that substitution of co-referring names inattitude ascriptions preserves truth value and proposition expressed.Thus, on this view, if Lucy wants Twain to autograph her book, thenshe also wants Clemens to autograph her book, even if she says ``I donot want Clemens to autograph my book''. Some philosophers (includingMichael Devitt and Mark Richard) claim that attitude ascriptions canbe used to predict behavior, but argue that if Russellianism weretrue, then this would not be so. They conclude that Russellianism isfalse. I defend Russellianism from this objection. I present severalanalyses of ``sentence S can be used to predict event E''. I arguethat, on each of these analyses, attitude ascriptions can be used topredict behavior, even if Russellianism is true. Furthermore, if myarguments are incorrect, and attitude ascriptions cannot be used topredict behavior under Russellianism, then Russellians can explainaway the intuition that they can be so used.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Susan Schneider (2009). LOT, CTM, and the Elephant in the Room. Synthese 170 (2):235 - 250.
Chris Tillman (2012). Reconciling Justificatory Internalism and Content Externalism. Synthese 187 (2):419-440.
Andrea Onofri (2013). On Non-Pragmatic Millianism. Philosophical Studies 166 (2):305-327.
Similar books and articles
Kenneth A. Taylor (1997). Review: Accomodationist Neo-Russellianism. [REVIEW] Noûs 31 (4):538 - 556.
Sean Crawford (2004). Pure Russellianism. Philosophical Papers 33 (2):171-202.
David Braun (2001). Russellianism and Explanation. Noûs 35 (s15):253-289.
David M. Braun (1998). Understanding Belief Reports. Philosophical Review 107 (4):555-595.
Jan Almäng (2012). Russellian Propositions and Properties. Metaphysica 13 (1):7-25.
Brad J. Thompson (2006). Color Constancy and Russellian Representationalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):75-94.
Brad J. Thompson (2008). Representationalism and the Conceivability of Inverted Spectra. Synthese 160 (2):203-213.
Cody Gilmore (2014). Parts of Propositions. In Shieva Kleinschmidt (ed.), Mereology and Location. Oxford University Press. 156-208.
Seyed N. Mousavian (2010). Neo-meinongian neo-Russellians. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):229-259.
David M. Braun (2000). Russellianism and Psychological Generalizations. Noûs 34 (2):203-236.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads23 ( #78,769 of 1,100,127 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #51,421 of 1,100,127 )
How can I increase my downloads?