Synthese 171 (2) (2009)
|Abstract||Bayesian models typically assume that agents are rational, logically omniscient and opinionated. The last of these has little descriptive or normative appeal, however, and limits our ability to describe how agents make up their minds (as opposed to changing them) or how they can suspend or withdraw their opinions. To address these limitations this paper represents the attitudinal states of non-opinionated agents by sets of (permissible) probability and desirability functions. Several basic ways in which such states of mind can be changed are then characterised and compared with those found in AGM style models of attitude revision. Finally these models are employed to describe how agents make up their mind when deliberating.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Matthew Talbert (2008). Blame and Responsiveness to Moral Reasons: Are Psychopaths Blameworthy? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):516-535.
Don Fallis (2007). Attitudes Toward Epistemic Risk and the Value of Experiments. Studia Logica 86 (2):215 - 246.
Cory Juhl (1993). Bayesianism and Reliable Scientific Inquiry. Philosophy of Science 60 (2):302-319.
Igor Douven & Alexander Riegler (2009). Extending the Hegselmann–Krause Model III: From Single Beliefs to Complex Belief States. Episteme 6 (2):145-163.
Hans Van Ditmarsch & Willem Labuschagne (2007). My Beliefs About Your Beliefs: A Case Study in Theory of Mind and Epistemic Logic. Synthese 155 (2):191 - 209.
Hans van Ditmarsch & Willem Labuschagne (2007). My Beliefs About Your Beliefs: A Case Study in Theory of Mind and Epistemic Logic. Synthese 155 (2).
Added to index2009-07-29
Total downloads15 ( #79,694 of 556,815 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,847 of 556,815 )
How can I increase my downloads?