Scaling the metaphorical brick wall

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):947-948 (1999)
Abstract
Palmer argues that functionalist accounts of the mind are radically incomplete in virtue of a “metaphorical brick wall” that precludes a complete treatment of qualia. I argue that functionalists should remain unmoved by this line of argument to the effect that their accounts fail to do justice to some “intrinsic” features of experience.
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