Scaling the metaphorical brick wall

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):947-948 (1999)
Abstract Palmer argues that functionalist accounts of the mind are radically incomplete in virtue of a “metaphorical brick wall” that precludes a complete treatment of qualia. I argue that functionalists should remain unmoved by this line of argument to the effect that their accounts fail to do justice to some “intrinsic” features of experience.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 5,875
External links
  • Through your library Configure

    Similar books and articles
    Aaron Wilson (2011). Peirce Versus Davidson on Metaphorical Meaning. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 47 (2):117-135.
    Catherine Wearing (2006). Metaphor and What is Said. Mind and Language 21 (3):310–332.
    Nikk Effingham & Jon Robson (2007). A Mereological Challenge to Endurantism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):633 – 640.

    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2009-01-28

    Total downloads

    5 ( #162,017 of 556,840 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    2 ( #39,122 of 556,840 )

    How can I increase my downloads?


    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.

    Other forums