David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 162 (2):201-217 (2013)
In this article, I attempt to resuscitate the perennially unfashionable distinctive feeling theory of pleasure (and pain), according to which for an experience to be pleasant (or unpleasant) is just for it to involve or contain a distinctive kind of feeling. I do this in two ways. First, by offering powerful new arguments against its two chief rivals: attitude theories, on the one hand, and the phenomenological theories of Roger Crisp, Shelly Kagan, and Aaron Smuts, on the other. Second, by showing how it can answer two important objections that have been made to it. First, the famous worry that there is no felt similarity to all pleasant (or unpleasant) experiences (sometimes called ‘the heterogeneity objection’). Second, what I call ‘Findlay’s objection’, the claim that it cannot explain the nature of our attraction to pleasure and aversion to pain.
|Keywords||Pleasure Distinctive Feeling View Feels Good Theory Aaron Smuts Shelly Kagan|
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Citations of this work BETA
Eden Lin (2015). Against Welfare Subjectivism. Noûs 50 (2):n/a-n/a.
Murat Aydede (2014). How to Unify Theories of Sensory Pleasure: An Adverbialist Proposal. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):119-133.
Sean Allen‐Hermanson (2015). Introspection, Anton's Syndrome, and Human Echolocation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):n/a-n/a.
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Jonathan Cohen & Matthew Fulkerson (2014). Affect, Rationalization, and Motivation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):103-118.
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