The Objects of Belief and Credence

Mind 125 (498):469-497 (2016)
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Abstract

David Chalmers uses Bayesian theories of credence to argue against referentialism about belief. This paper argues that Chalmers’s Bayesian objections to referentialism are similar to older, more familiar objections to referentialism. There are familiar responses to the old objections, and there is a predictable way to modify those old responses to meet Chalmers’s Bayesian objections. The new responses to the new objections are no less plausible than the old responses to the old objections. Chalmers’s positive theory of belief and credence is structurally similar to typical referential theories of those objects, but his theory is more speculative and dubious.

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David Braun
University at Buffalo

Citations of this work

A Paradox of Evidential Equivalence.David Builes - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):113-127.
The Normative Property Dualism Argument.Jesse Hambly - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.
Two-Dimensional De Se Chance Deference.J. Dmitri Gallow - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Does conceivability entail possibility.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.
Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.

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