Two problems about human agency

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):309–326 (2001)
I consider two inter-related problems in the philosophy of action. One concerns the role of the agent in the determination of action, and I call it the problem of agential authority. The other concerns the relation between motivating desire and the agent's normative deliberation, and I call it the problem of subjective normative authority. In part by way of discussion of work of Harry Frankfurt and Christine Korsgaard, I argue that we make progress with these problems by appeal to certain kinds of higher-order policies and to their role in the cross-temporal organization of the deliberation and action of temporally persisting agents like us
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DOI 10.1111/j.0066-7372.2003.00033.x
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Luca Ferrero (2009). What Good Is a Diachronic Will? Philosophical Studies 144 (3):403 - 430.
Krista Lawlor (2009). Knowing What One Wants. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):47-75.
Kieran Setiya (2011). Reasons and Causes. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):129-157.

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