Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):309–326 (2001)
|Abstract||I consider two inter-related problems in the philosophy of action. One concerns the role of the agent in the determination of action, and I call it the problem of agential authority. The other concerns the relation between motivating desire and the agent's normative deliberation, and I call it the problem of subjective normative authority. In part by way of discussion of work of Harry Frankfurt and Christine Korsgaard, I argue that we make progress with these problems by appeal to certain kinds of higher-order policies and to their role in the cross-temporal organization of the deliberation and action of temporally persisting agents like us|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
David Enoch (2006). Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won't Come From What is Constitutive of Action. Philosophical Review 115 (2):169-198.
R. Jay Wallace (1999). Three Conceptions of Rational Agency. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):217-242.
Agnieszka Jaworska (2007). Caring and Internality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3):529-568.
Michael Bratman (1999). Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency. Cambridge University Press.
Markus E. Schlosser (2008). Agent-Causation and Agential Control. Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):3-21.
Jeffrey Seidman (2009). Valuing and Caring. Theoria 75 (4):272-303.
Krist Vaesen (2006). How Norms in Technology Ought to Be Interpreted. Techne 10 (1):117-133.
Daniel Hunter (1994). Act Utilitarianism and Dynamic Deliberation. Erkenntnis 41 (1):1 - 35.
Michael Bratman (2007). Anchors for Deliberation. In Christoph Lumer & Sandro Nannini (eds.), Intentionality, deliberation and autonomy: the action-theoretic basis of practical philosophy. Ashgate Publishing.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads89 ( #8,142 of 556,803 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #16,099 of 556,803 )
How can I increase my downloads?