David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):59-83 (2001)
Some theories of personal identity allow some variation in what it takes for a person to survive from context to context; and sometimes this is determined by the desires of person-stages or the practices of communities.This leads to problems for decision making in contexts where what is chosen will affect personal identity.‘Temporal Phase Pluralism’ solves such problems by allowing that there can be a plurality of persons constituted by a sequence of person stages. This illuminates difficult decision making problems when persons have to choose between different life-altering choices
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Kristie Miller (2013). “Personal Identity” Minus the Persons. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):91-109.
Kristie Miller (2010). Persons as Sui Generis Ontological Kinds: Advice to Exceptionists. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):567-593.
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