The value of the virtues

Philosophical Studies 125 (1):85 - 113 (2005)
Abstract
Direct theories of the virtues maintain that an explanation of why some virtuous trait counts as valuable should ultimately appeal to the value of its characteristic motive or aim. In this paper I argue that, if we take the idea of a direct approach to virtue theory seriously, we should favour a view according to which virtue involves knowledge. I raise problems for recent “agent-based” and “end-based” versions of the direct approach, show how my account proves preferable to these, and defend it against a number of objections.
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    References found in this work BETA
    Julia Driver (1989). The Virtues of Ignorance. Journal of Philosophy 86 (7):373-384.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely (2012). The Virtues of Ignorance. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (3):335-350.
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