Online research in philosophy

0.138% above the neutron and 0.276% above the proton baryon mass a natural mass unit µ can be identified by extrapolating dimensionless Planck units h=c=1 to the System of Units (SI). Similar to quantum measurements that determine h it is only necessary to relate the unit kinetic particle energy to the quantum energy of a photon having a unit wavelength. Connecting both energies and shifting the units, the inverse ratio of length units evolves proportional to the square of velocity units (...) since both are proportional to the energy unit. With this connection the measurement of h becomes an indirect light velocity measurement and measurement of µ and shows that nonzero action and mass quanta corresponds to a finite light velocity c. As already shown, these sequential baryon mass differences (typical mass deficits of strong interaction) including the electron mass can be recovered within measurement error (some ppm) by simple relations obtained from bosonizing a massive Dirac equation. (shrink)

It has increasingly been recognised that units of biological classification cannot be identified with the units of evolution. After briefly defending the necessity of this distinction I argue, contrary to the prevailing orthodoxy, that species should be treated as the fundamental units of classification and not, therefore, as units of evolution. This perspective fits well with the increasing tendency to reject the search for a monistic basis of classification and embrace a pluralistic and pragmatic account of the species category. It (...) also provides a diagnosis of the paradoxical but popular idea that species are individuals: Species are not individuals, but the units of evolution are. (shrink)

This paper challenges the Kripkean interpretation of a posteriori necessities. It will be demonstrated, by an analysis of classic examples, that the modal content of supposed a posteriori necessities is more complicated than the Kripkean line suggests. We will see that further research is needed concerning the a priori principles underlying all a posteriori necessities. In the course of this analysis it will emerge that the modal content of a posteriori necessities can be best described in terms of a Finean (...) conception of modality – by giving essences priority over modality. The upshot of this is that we might be able to establish the necessity of certain supposed a posteriori necessities by a priori means. (shrink)

Despite the traditional focus on metaphysical issues in discussions of natural kinds in biology, epistemological considerations are at least as important. By revisiting the debate as to whether taxa are kinds or individuals, I argue that both accounts are metaphysically compatible, but that one or the other approach can be pragmatically preferable depending on the epistemic context. Recent objections against construing species as homeostatic property cluster kinds are also addressed. The second part of the paper broadens the perspective by considering (...) homologues as another example of natural kinds, comparing them with analogues as functionally defined kinds. Given that there are various types of natural kinds, I discuss the different theoretical purposes served by diverse kind concepts, suggesting that there is no clear-cut distinction between natural kinds and other kinds, such as functional kinds. Rather than attempting to offer a unique metaphysical account of ‘natural’ kind, a more fruitful approach consists in the epistemological study of how different natural kind concepts are employed in scientific reasoning. (shrink)

It is hard to exaggerate the extent to which Kripke’s work has changed the way we do philosophy. He has been compared to Socrates and touted as “arguably the world’s greatest living philosopher.” 1 The London Review of Books proclaims that “philosophers are busily rewriting all of semantics (and a good deal of epistemology) in Kripkean terms.” Just what are these terms? The central semantic notion is that of rigid designation, by now a household name. Kripke (Kripke 1972 (henceforth NN)) (...) says that a rigid designator is something that designates the same object in every possible world where it designates at all. Kripke himself has been reluctant to give a theoretical account of rigid designation, preferring instead to talk in terms of a ‘better picture’ which comports with intuition but it seems reasonably clear that Kripke intends this to be a semantic property that some words have (like names and natural kind terms) and that others lack (like definite descriptions). This ‘better picture’ has been developed rigorously by Michael Devitt into a theory (Devitt 1974; Devitt 1981a; Devitt and Sterelny 1999). In the meantime attention has shifted from a general discussion of what rigid designation is to the question of whether and how rigid designation works for natural kind terms like ‘gold,’ and ‘tiger’ (Devitt forthcoming). (shrink)

This paper discusses whether it can be known a priori that a particular term, such as water, is a natural kind term, and how this problem relates to Putnams claim that natural kind terms require an externalist semantics. Two conceptions of natural kind terms are contrasted: The first holds that whether water is a natural kind term depends on its a priori knowable semantic features. The second.