Units of measurement and natural kinds: Some Kripkean considerations [Book Review]

Erkenntnis 33 (3):297 - 317 (1990)
Abstract
Kripke has argued that definitions of units of measurements provide examples of statements that are both contingent and a priori. In this paper I argue that definitions of units of measurement are intended to be stipulations of what Kripke calls theoretical identities: a stipulation that two terms will have the same rigid designation. Hence such a definition is both a priori and necessary. The necessity arises because such definitions appeal to natural kind properties only, which on Kripke's account are necessary.
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References found in this work BETA
Virgil C. Aldrich (1983). Standard of Length. Philosophical Investigations 6 (2):135-141.
Albert Casullo (1987). Kripke on the a Priori and the Necessary. In Paul K. Moser (ed.), A Priori Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 152 - 159.

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Citations of this work BETA
Willard L. Brigner (1993). The Phantom Limb Extrapolation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):139.

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