David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Metaphilosophy 41 (1):115-131 (2010)
The perceptual model of emotions maintains that emotions involve, or are at least analogous to, perceptions of value. On this account, emotions purport to tell us about the evaluative realm, in much the same way that sensory perceptions inform us about the sensible world. An important development of this position, prominent in recent work by Peter Goldie amongst others, concerns the essential role that virtuous habits of attention play in enabling us to gain perceptual and evaluative knowledge. I think that there are good reasons to be sceptical about this picture of virtue. In this essay I set out these reasons, and explain the consequences this scepticism has for our understanding of the relation between virtue, emotion, and attention. In particular, I argue that our primary capacity for recognizing value is in fact a non-emotional capacity.
|Keywords||virtue attention knowledge value emotion perception|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Martha C. Nussbaum (2001). Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions. Cambridge University Press.
Jesse J. Prinz (2004). Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of the Emotions. Oxford University Press.
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Bill Brewer (1999/2002). Perception and Reason. Oxford University Press.
Robert Campbell Roberts (2003). Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Sabine A. Döring (2015). What's Wrong With Recalcitrant Emotions? From Irrationality to Challenge of Agential Identity. Dialectica 69 (3):381-402.
Cain Todd (2014). Emotion and Value. Philosophy Compass 9 (10):702-712.
Sabine A. Döring & Anika Lutz (2015). Beyond Perceptualism: Introduction to the Special Issue. Dialectica 69 (3):259-270.
Michael Lacewing (2015). Emotion, Perception, and the Self in Moral Epistemology. Dialectica 69 (3):335-355.
Jérôme Dokic & Stéphane Lemaire (2015). Are Emotions Evaluative Modes? Dialectica 69 (3):271-292.
Similar books and articles
Demian Whiting (2012). Are Emotions Perceptual Experiences of Value? Ratio 25 (1):93-107.
Peter Goldie (2011). Intellectual Emotions and Religious Emotions. Faith and Philosophy 28 (1):93-101.
Sarah Moses (2009). "Keeping the Heart": Natural Affection in Joseph Butler's Approach to Virtue. Journal of Religious Ethics 37 (4):613-629.
Michael S. Brady (2009). The Irrationality of Recalcitrant Emotions. Philosophical Studies 145 (3):413 - 430.
Edoardo Zamuner (2008). Knowledge and Self-Knowledge of Emotions. Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (2002). Fear and the Focus of Attention. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (2):105-144.
Peter Goldie (2004). Emotion, Feeling, and Knowledge of the World. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press
Susan Stark (2004). A Change of Heart: Moral Emotions, Transformation, and Moral Virtue. Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (1):31-50.
Charles Starkey (2008). Emotion and Full Understanding. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (4):425 - 454.
Added to index2010-01-12
Total downloads205 ( #9,964 of 1,781,161 )
Recent downloads (6 months)11 ( #68,841 of 1,781,161 )
How can I increase my downloads?