Journal of Philosophy 60 (15):425-435 (1963)
|Abstract||Some features of the concept of a want, and of the explaining relation in which a want may stand to an action, have not received sufficient attention. In what follows we shall offer some suggestions and descriptions which may be one step toward remedy of this situationi. We shall be at pains to point out the extent to which the features we describe fit in with a conception of the explanations of actions conforming to the inferential (deductive or inductive) and nomological patterns of scientific explanation, and also to point out where perhaps the fit is not so snug.|
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