David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Noûs 38 (1):1–28 (2004)
Epicurus seems to have thought that death is not bad for the one who dies, since its badness cannot be located in time. I show that Epicurus’ argument presupposes Presentism, and I argue that death is bad for its victim at all and only those times when the person would have been living a life worth living had she not died when she did. I argue that my account is superior to competing accounts given by Thomas Nagel, Fred Feldman and Neil Feit.
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References found in this work BETA
Ben Bradley (1998). Extrinsic Value. Philosophical Studies 91 (2):109-126.
Kai Draper (1999). Disappointment, Sadness, and Death. Philosophical Review 108 (3):387-414.
Neil Feit (2002). The Time of Death's Misfortune. Noûs 36 (3):359–383.
Citations of this work BETA
Matthew Hanser (2011). Still More on the Metaphysics of Harm. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):459-469.
Steven Luper (2007). Mortal Harm. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):239–251.
Neil Feit (2013). Plural Harm. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):n/a-n/a.
Ben Bradley (2012). Doing Away with Harm1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):390-412.
James Delaney & David Hershenov (2009). Why Consent May Not Be Needed For Organ Procurement. American Journal of Bioethics 9 (8):3-10.
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Aaron Smuts (2012). Less Good but Not Bad: In Defense of Epicureanism About Death. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):197-227.
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