When is death bad for the one who dies?

Noûs 38 (1):1–28 (2004)
Epicurus seems to have thought that death is not bad for the one who dies, since its badness cannot be located in time. I show that Epicurus’ argument presupposes Presentism, and I argue that death is bad for its victim at all and only those times when the person would have been living a life worth living had she not died when she did. I argue that my account is superior to competing accounts given by Thomas Nagel, Fred Feldman and Neil Feit.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2004.00460.x
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References found in this work BETA
Ned Markosian (2004). A Defence of Presentism. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1 (3):47-82.

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Citations of this work BETA
Matthew Hanser (2011). Still More on the Metaphysics of Harm. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):459-469.
Steven Luper (2007). Mortal Harm. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):239–251.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

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