David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Language 21 (1):74-107 (2006)
Prominent accounts of language use (those of Grice, Lewis, Stalnaker, Sperber and Wilson among others) have viewed basic communicative acts as essentially involving the attitudes of the participating agents. Developmental data poses a dilemma for these accounts, since it suggests children below age four are competent communicators but would lack the ability to conceptualise communication if philosophers and linguists are right about what communication is. This paper argues that this dilemma is quite serious and that these prominent accounts would be undermined if an adequate more minimal alternative were available. Just such a minimalist account of communication is offered, drawing on ideas from relevance theory and situation theory
|Keywords||Action Communication Feeling Folk Psychology Gaze Language Relevance Situation|
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Michael Wilby (2010). The Simplicity of Mutual Knowledge. Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):83-100.
Mitchell S. Green (2009). Speech Acts, the Handicap Principle and the Expression of Psychological States. Mind and Language 24 (2):139-163.
John Eriksson (2011). Straight Talk: Conceptions of Sincerity in Speech. Philosophical Studies 153 (2):213-234.
Gergely Csibra (2010). Recognizing Communicative Intentions in Infancy. Mind and Language 25 (2):141-168.
Hannes Rakoczy (2008). Pretence as Individual and Collective Intentionality. Mind and Language 23 (5):499-517.
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