David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Minds and Machines 13 (4):567-575 (2003)
The paper deals with the question whether logical truth carry information. On the one hand it seems that we gain new information by drawing inferences or arriving at some theorems. On the other hand the formal accounts of information and information content which are most widely known today say that logical truth carry no information at all. The latter is shown by considering these accounts. Then several ways to deal with the dilemma are distinguished, especially syntactic and ontological solutions. A version of a syntactical solution is favoured.
|Keywords||algorithmic information depth information information content logical form logical truth|
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Citations of this work BETA
Hilmi Demir (2008). Counterfactuals Vs. Conditional Probabilities: A Critical Analysis of the Counterfactual Theory of Information. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):45 – 60.
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