Online research in philosophy

Outlines of Scepticism, by the Greek philosopher Sextus Empiricus, is a work of major importance for the history of Greek philosophy. It is the fullest extant account of ancient scepticism, and it is also one of our most copious sources of information about the other Hellenistic philosophies. Its first part contains an elaborate exposition of the Pyrrhonian variety of scepticism; its second and third parts are critical and destructive, arguing against 'dogmatism' in logic, epistemology, science and ethics - an approach that revolutionized the study of philosophy when Sextus' works were rediscovered and published in the sixteenth century. This volume presents the accurate and readable translation which was first published in 1994, together with a substantial new historical and philosophical introduction by Jonathan Barnes.

A study of Pyrrhonean skepticism, this book includes a new translation of Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism, accompanied by an analytic introduction and an in-depth, section-by-section commentary. It presents Pyrrhonism as a marked influence on the philosophical theories of Montaigne, Gassendi, Descartes, Bayle and other major thinkers, and discusses specific features of this form of skepticism which make it immune to many of the standard criticisms.

The purpose of this paper is twofold: to discuss some challenging issues concerning Sextus’ works and outlook, and to offer an overview of the influence exerted by Sextan Pyrrhonism on both early modern and contemporary philosophy.

Blank presents a new translation into clear modern English of a key treatise by one of the greatest of ancient philosophers, together with the first ever commentary on this work. Sextus Empiricus's Against the Grammarians is a polemical attack on ancient Greek ideas about grammar, and provides one of the best examples of sustained Sceptical reasoning.

Many philosophers have challenged the problem of skepticism. I argue that none of them successfully dispute the system established by Sextus Empiricus. But not just that; the main thesis proposed is that this kind of skepticism is unsolvable. I maintain that there are two fundamental strategies in Sextus' Outlines of Phyrrhonism. One of them is that the basic description of skepticism has a paradoxical character. The other focuses on the Five Modes of Agrippa that comprise a system of dialectical moves for suspending judgment. The modes have, as a system, the capacity to reposition in any circumstance, so it is impossible to justify to the skeptic why he needs to abandon his skepticism. I explain, in brief, why the most important objections to skepticism do not solve this challenge. In opposition to common view, I argue that Sextus' phyrrhonism is practicable, coherent and consistent. Although there is no possible solution to skepticism, there is at least a general way to answer it without contradiction, infinite regression or becoming a skeptic.

The subject is Sextus Empiricus, one the chief sources of information on ancient philosophy and one of the most influential authors in the history of skepticism. Sextus' works have had an extraordinary influence on western philosophy, and this book provides the first exhaustive and detailed study of their recovery, transmission, and intellectual influence through Late Antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance. This study deals with Sextus' biography, as well as the history of the availability and reception of his works. It also contains an extensive bibliographical section, including editions, translations, and commentaries.

Alan Bailey offers a clear and vigorous exposition and defence of the philosophy of Sextus Empiricus, one of the most influential of ancient thinkers, the father of philosophical scepticism. The subsequent sceptical tradition in philosophy has not done justice to Sextus: his views stand up today as remarkably insightful, offering a fruitful way to approach issues of knowledge, understanding, belief, and rationality. Bailey's refreshing presentation of Sextus to a modern philosophical readership rescues scepticism from the sceptics.

In this paper I take a closer look at Sextus Empiricus’ arguments in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.25-30 and try to make sense of his account of Skepticism as a goal-directed philosophy. I argue that Sextus fails to mount a convincing case for the view that tranquility, rather than suspension of judgment, is the ultimate goal of his inquiries.