Online research in philosophy

Syndromic surveillance uses new ways of gathering data to identify possible disease outbreaks. Because syndromic surveillance can be implemented to detect patterns before diseases are even identified, it poses novel problems for informed consent, patient privacy and confidentiality, and risks of stigmatization. This paper analyzes these ethical issues from the viewpoint of the patient as victim and vector. It concludes by pointing out that the new International Health Regulations fail to take full account of the ethical challenges raised by syndromic surveillance.

Surveillance has become a routine, everyday occurrence ininformational societies. Many agencies have an interest in personal data, and a wide spectrum of them use searchabledatabases to classify and catalogue such data. From policingto welfare to the Internet and e-commerce, personal data havebecome very valuable, economically and administratively. Whilequestions of privacy are indeed raised by such surveillance,the processes described here have as much to do with social sorting,and thus present new problems of automated categorization of datasubjects. Privacy and data protection measures do address someof the questions raised, but they tend to be limited to individualisticreadings of the situation, and not to consider issues of fairnessand equality. An ethics for everyday surveillance is proposed thatconsiders personhood as central, but highlights its social andembodied dimensions. Reductionism of practice and of analysisis thus avoided as the face comes to the fore. Hence the title.

The development of ever smaller integrated circuits at the sub-micron and nanoscale—in accordance with Moore’s Law—drives the production of very small tags, smart cards, smart labels and sensors. Nanoelectronics and submicron technology supports surveillance technology which is practically invisible. I argue that one of the most urgent and immediate concerns associated with nanotechnology is privacy. Computing in the twenty-first century will not only be pervasive and ubiquitous, but also inconspicuous. If these features are not counteracted in design, they will facilitate ubiquitous surveillance practices which are widely available, cheap, and intrusive. RFID technology is an instructive example of what nanotechnology has in store for privacy.

Questions of privacy have become particularly salient in recent years due, in part, to information-gathering initiatives precipitated by the 2001 World Trade Center attacks, increasing power of surveillance and computing technologies, and massive data collection about individuals for commercial purposes. While privacy is not new to the philosophical and legal literature, there is much to say about the nature and value of privacy. My focus here is on the nature of informational privacy. I argue that the predominant accounts of privacy are unsatisfactory and offer an alternative: for a person to have informational privacy is for there to be limits on the particularized judgments that others are able to reasonably make about that person.

Computers and new information technologies have greatly increased the power of surveillance by government and large corporate entities. The state is a repository of a growing array of data bases that provide it with information on its citizens. Corporations also now possess increasing power to accumulate information on potential consumers. This power to collect information is significant and can be instrumental in securing loans, insurance, and credit; increases the power of law enforcement agencies; makes possible surveillance of workers and the workplace by managers; and provides information on consumer habits and preferences that can be useful to the marketing and promotion of consumer goods. The intensifying computerization of information raises important questions concerning privacy and individual rights in the current information revolution, such as: who collects what kind of information, what is done with this information, and what rights do individuals have concerning privacy and the circulation of information about them?

We argue that nano-technology in the form of invisible tags, sensors, and Radio Frequency Identity Chips (RFIDs) will give rise to privacy issues that are in two ways different from the traditional privacy issues of the last decades. One, they will not exclusively revolve around the idea of centralization of surveillance and concentration of power, as the metaphor of the Panopticon suggests, but will be about constant observation at decentralized levels. Two, privacy concerns may not exclusively be about constraining information flows but also about designing of materials and nano-artifacts such as chips and tags. We begin by presenting a framework for structuring the current debates on privacy, and then present our arguments.

Fairchild, Center for the History and Ethics of Public Health in the Department of Sociomedical Sciences at Columbia University's Mailman School of Public Health Abstract Surveillance is a cornerstone of public health. It permits us to recognize disease outbreaks, to track the incidence and prevalence of threats to public health, and to monitor the effectiveness of our interventions. But surveillance also challenges our understandings of the significance and role of privacy in a liberal democracy. In this paper we trace the century-long history of public health surveillance in the United States situating that history in the context of the broad social, political, and ideological forces that have shaped our conceptions of privacy. Although we focus here on the United States, the debates over privacy that unfolded in the 1960s were repeated in many European nations. The themes we explore here, then, provide a framework for examining the relationship between privacy and public health in other contexts. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?

Privacy as confidentiality has been the dominant paradigm in computer science privacy research. Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) that guarantee confidentiality of personal data or anonymous communication have resulted from such research. The objective of this paper is to show that such PETs are indispensable but are short of being the privacy solutions they sometimes claim to be given current day circumstances. Using perspectives from surveillance studies we will argue that the computer scientists’ conception of privacy through data or communication confidentiality is techno-centric and displaces end-user perspectives and needs in surveillance societies. We will further show that the perspectives from surveillance studies also demand a critical review for their human-centric conception of information systems. Last, we rethink the position of PETs in a surveillance society and argue for the necessity of multiple paradigms for addressing privacy concerns in information systems design.

While maintaining the importance of privacy for critical evaluations of surveillance technologies, I suggest that privacy also constrains the debate by framing analyses in terms of the individual. Public space provides a site for considering what is at stake with surveillance technologies besides privacy. After describing two accounts of privacy and one of public space, I argue that surveillance technologies simultaneously add an ambiguityand a specificity to public places that are detrimental to the social, cultural, and civic importance of these places. By making public places accessible to other places and/or times, surveillance technologies make these social contexts ambiguous by blurring their spatial and temporal bounds. At the same time, surveillancetechnologies valence public places in functionally specificways that are detrimental to informal civic life. To complement defensive approaches to surveillance technologies based onindividual privacy, I conclude by suggesting how sociality as a relational value or an ethics of place as a contextual value could provide a proactive line of reasoning for affirming the value ofthat which is between people and places.

This paper examines workplace surveillance and monitoring. It is argued that privacy is a moral right, and while such surveillance and monitoring can be justified in some circumstances, there is a presumption against the infringement of privacy. An account of privacy precedes consideration of various arguments frequently given for the surveillance and monitoring of employees, arguments which look at the benefits, or supposed benefits, to employees as well as to employers. The paper examines the general monitoring of work, and the monitoring of email, listservers and the World Wide Web. It is argued that many of the common justifications given for this surveillance and monitoring do not stand up to close scrutiny.