Graduate studies at Western
In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press (2008)
|Abstract||The question how to account for illusion has had a prominent role in shaping theories of perception throughout the history of philosophy. Prevailing philosophical wisdom today has it that phenomena of illusion force us to choose between the following two options. First, reject altogether the early modern empiricist idea that the core subjective character of perceptual experience is to be given simply by citing the object presented in that experience. Instead we must characterize perceptual experience entirely in terms of its representational content. Second, retain the early modern idea that the core subjective character of experience is simply constituted by the identity of its direct objects, but admit that these must be mind-dependent entities, distinct from the mind-independent physical objects we all know and love. I argue here that the early modern empiricists had an indispensable insight. The idea that the core subjective character of perceptual experience is to be given simply by citing the object presented in that experience is more fundamental than any appeal to perceptual content, and can account for illusion, and indeed hallucination, without resorting to the problematic postulation of any such mind-dependent objects.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Zenon Pylyshyn (2004). The Illusion of Explanation: The Experience of Volition, Mental Effort, and Mental Imagery. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):672-673.
Hannah Ginsborg (2011). Perception, Generality, and Reasons. In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
Joel Feldman (2005). Vasubandhu's Illusion Argument and the Parasitism of Illusion Upon Veridical Experience. Philosophy East and West 55 (4):529-541.
Johannes Roessler (2009). Perceptual Experience and Perceptual Knowledge. Mind 118 (472):1013-1041.
Tamar Szabó Gendler (2006). Introduction: Perceptual Experience. In John Hawthorne & Tamar Szabó Gendler (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.
Susanna Siegel (2006). Direct Realism and Perceptual Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):378-410.
Susanna Schellenberg (2010). The Particularity and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Studies 149 (1):19 - 48.
René Jagnow (2012). Representationalism and the Perspectival Character of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Studies 157 (2):227-249.
Ian Phillips (2005). Experience and Intentional Content. Dissertation, Oxford University
Clare Batty (2010). What the Nose Doesn't Know: Non-Veridicality and Olfactory Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (3-4):10-17.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads257 ( #917 of 739,080 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #14,975 of 739,080 )
How can I increase my downloads?