Internal Realism

In P. Hannah (ed.), An Anthology of Philosophical Studies (2008)
This essay characterizes a version of internal realism. In §1 I will argue that for semantical reasons we should be realists of a strong kind. In §2 I plead for an internalistic setting of realism starting from the thesis that truth is, at least, not a non-epistemic concept. We have to bear the consequences of this in form of a more complicated concept of truth. The ‘internal’ of ‘internal realism’ points to the justification aspect of truth. The ‘realism’ of ‘internal realism’ points to the correspondence aspect. A thesis concerning the irreducibility of the two aspects will be established in §3
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,658
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Brian Ellis (1988). Internal Realism. Synthese 76 (3):409 - 434.
William Newton-Smith (1988). Modest Realism. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:179 - 189.
Luca Moretti (2003). Putnam's Internal Realism. Dissertation, King's College London
Valer Ambrus (1999). Is Putnam's Causal Theory of Meaning Compatible with Internal Realism? Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 30 (1):1-16.
Gordon Steinhoff (1986). Internal Realism, Truth and Understanding. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:352 - 363.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

66 ( #51,372 of 1,725,958 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

10 ( #64,234 of 1,725,958 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.