Methodologische Überlegungen zu tierischen Überzeugungen / Methodological Reflections on Exploring Beliefs in Animals

Abstract
A theory of the beliefs of non-human animals is not closed to us, only because we do not have beliefs of their kind. Starting from a theory of human beliefs and working on a building block model of propositional attitudes a theory of animal beliefs is viable. Such a theory is an example of the broader conception of a heterophenomenological approach to animal cognition. The theory aims at outlining the crucial differences between human and animal beliefs as well as the relations between these attitudes and theories of them. By this it contributes both to a theory of human cognition and to a theory of the evolutionary origin of human cognition. The capacities of animals can thus be appreciated without making animals minor humans. Human cognition can be seen in its uniqueness without cutting the ties to its evolutionary origin.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index Translate to english
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,074
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 11 references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Manuel Bremer (2007). Methodologische Überlegungen Zu Tierischen Überzeugungen. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 38 (2):347-355.
Toshihiko Ise (2008). Hume's Animal and Situated Human Reason. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 16:141-147.
David Martel Johnson (1988). Brutes Believe Not. Philosophical Psychology 1 (3):279-294.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-05-29

Total downloads

6 ( #204,508 of 1,101,573 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #117,010 of 1,101,573 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.