Methodologische Überlegungen zu tierischen Überzeugungen / Methodological Reflections on Exploring Beliefs in Animals

A theory of the beliefs of non-human animals is not closed to us, only because we do not have beliefs of their kind. Starting from a theory of human beliefs and working on a building block model of propositional attitudes a theory of animal beliefs is viable. Such a theory is an example of the broader conception of a heterophenomenological approach to animal cognition. The theory aims at outlining the crucial differences between human and animal beliefs as well as the relations between these attitudes and theories of them. By this it contributes both to a theory of human cognition and to a theory of the evolutionary origin of human cognition. The capacities of animals can thus be appreciated without making animals minor humans. Human cognition can be seen in its uniqueness without cutting the ties to its evolutionary origin.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.2307/20722496
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index Translate to english
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,667
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Donald R. Griffin (1992). Animal Minds. University of Chicago Press.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Manuel Bremer (2007). Methodologische Überlegungen Zu Tierischen Überzeugungen. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 38 (2):347-355.
Eric T. Olson (forthcoming). The Remnant-Person Problem. In Stephan Blatti Paul F. Snowdon (ed.), Essays on Animalism. Oxford University Press
Toshihiko Ise (2008). Hume's Animal and Situated Human Reason. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 16:141-147.
David Martel Johnson (1988). Brutes Believe Not. Philosophical Psychology 1 (3):279-294.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

10 ( #235,035 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #369,877 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.