Graduate studies at Western
European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):165-181 (2006)
|Abstract||It is close to current orthodoxy that perceptual experience is to be characterized, at least in part, by its representational content, roughly, by the way it represents things as being in the world around the perceiver. Call this basic idea the content view (CV)|
|Keywords||Content Epistemology Generality Perception Reason Mcdowell, John|
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