Personal identity and personal survival

Analysis 42 (January):44-50 (1982)
Parfit argues that survival, Not identity, Is the important thing in cases of personal resurrection, Fission, Etc. I argue that parfit's and dennett's well known cases--And fantasies about cloning and telecloning--Suggest a distinction between type and token persons, Memories, Intentions, Etc. Parfit is wrong, I suggest, To think survival more determinate than identity; with quine I hold that there is no objective matter to be right or wrong about
Keywords Continuity  Identity  Metaphysics  Survival  Elliott, R
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DOI 10.1093/analys/42.1.44
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