Erkenntnis 39 (2):191 - 208 (1993)
|Abstract||Since universal language systems are confronted with serious paradoxical consequences, a semantic approach is developed in whichpartial worlds form the ontological basis. This approach shares withsituation semantics the basic idea that statements always refer to certain partial worlds, and it agrees with the extensional and model-theoretic character ofpossible worlds semantics. Within the framework of the partial worlds conception a satisfactory solution to theLiar paradox can be formulated. In particular, one advantage of this approach over those theories that are based on the totality of possible worlds semantics can be found in the fact that the so-called Strengthened Liar problem is avoided.|
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