Online research in philosophy

I offer a critique of how we have gotten to the point of considering xenografts into humans through a kind of moral failure to generate an efficient system of organ harvesting from human cadavers. I consider several proposals for increasing the supply of transplantable human organs, including one recently proposed in detail by James Lindemann Nelson of the Hastings Center for routine retrieval with an opt-out option.

In The Retrieval of Ethics, Talbot Brewer defends an Aristotelian-inspired understanding of the good life, in which living the good life is conceived of in terms of engaging in a unified dialectical activity. In this essay, I explore the assumptions at work in Brewer's understanding of dialectical activity and raise some concerns about whether or not we have reason to embrace them. I argue that his conception of human nature and that towards which we are drawn stands in tension with empirical research on motivation. Given this tension, I conclude that it is implausible to construe living the good life as a unified dialectical activity.

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