What is Logical Pluralism?

Within the philosophy of logic there has been an old debate about strengths and weaknesses of so-called “deviant” logics, as compared to standard logic (i.e. First Order Logic with Identity). With the development of a multitude of many-valued and modal logical systems and the various ways they can be employed in various fields of philosophy, linguistics and computer science, former “deviant” logics have become well accepted. Nowadays we seem to have a new and almost contrary debate about whether there is any universal logic at all or only a multitude of systems: logical pluralism. But what does logical pluralism claim? In this paper one prominent version of logical pluralism is the main target of further questions
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