Absolute Actuality and the Plurality of Worlds

Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):41–76 (2006)
According to David Lewis, a realist about possible worlds must hold that actuality is relative: the worlds are ontologically all on a par; the actual and the merely possible differ, not absolutely, but in how they relate to us. Call this 'Lewisian realism'. The alternative, 'Leibnizian realism', holds that actuality is an absolute property that marks a distinction in ontological status. Lewis presents two arguments against Leibnizian realism. First, he argues that the Leibnizian realist cannot account for the contingency of actuality. Second, he argues that the Leibnizian realist cannot explain why skepticism about one's own actuality is absurd. In this paper, I mount a defense of Leibnizian realism.
Keywords Modal Realism  Possible Worlds  Absolute Actuality  Leibnizian Realism
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DOI 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2006.00102.x
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1996). Elusive Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
David Lewis (1979). Attitudes de Dicto and de Se. Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.

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Sam Cowling (2013). Ideological Parsimony. Synthese 190 (17):3889-3908.
Barak Krakauer (2013). What Are Impossible Worlds? Philosophical Studies 165 (3):989-1007.
Sam Cowling (2013). The Way of Actuality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2):1-17.

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