David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Minds and Machines 4 (4):469-88 (1994)
What''s computation? The received answer is that computation is a computer at work, and a computer at work is that which can be modelled as a Turing machine at work. Unfortunately, as John Searle has recently argued, and as others have agreed, the received answer appears to imply that AI and Cog Sci are a royal waste of time. The argument here is alarmingly simple: AI and Cog Sci (of the Strong sort, anyway) are committed to the view that cognition is computation (or brains are computers); butall processes are computations (orall physical things are computers); so AI and Cog Sci are positively silly.I refute this argument herein, in part by defining the locutions x is a computer and c is a computation in a way that blocks Searle''s argument but exploits the hard-to-deny link between What''s Computation? and the theory of computation. However, I also provide, at the end of this essay, an argument which, it seems to me, implies not that AI and Cog Sci are silly, but that they''re based on a form of computation that is well beneath human persons.
|Keywords||Artificial Intelligence Computation Machine Science Turing, A|
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References found in this work BETA
George Boolos, John Burgess, Richard P. & C. Jeffrey (2007). Computability and Logic. Cambridge University Press.
Selmer Bringsjord (1991). Is the Connectionist-Logicist Debate One of Ai's Wonderful Red Herrings? Journal of Theoretical and Experimental Artificial Intelligence 3:319-49.
Arthur W. Burks (1973). Logic, Computers, and Men. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 46:39-57.
Daniel C. Dennett (1993). Review of Searle, the Rediscovery of the Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophical Explorations 90 (4):93-205.
Citations of this work BETA
Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic (2011). Significance of Models of Computation, From Turing Model to Natural Computation. Minds and Machines 21 (2):301-322.
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