Does it matter that nothing we do will matter in a million years?
Dialogue 46 (1):3-25 (2007)
| Abstract | People have inferred that our lives are absurd from the supposed fact that nothing we do will matter in a million years. In this article, I critically discuss this argument for absurdity. After explaining how two refutations in the literature fail to undermine the best version of the argument, I produce several considerations that together do take much of the force out of the argument. I conclude by suggesting that these considerations not only refute this argument for absurdity, but also constitute a motivation to be moral.On a pu déduire que nos vies sont absurdes en supposant que rien de ce que nous faisons n’aura d’importance dans un million d’années. Dans cet article, j’évalue cet argument en faveur de l’absurdité. Après avoir expliqué comment deux réfutations formulées dans la littérature sur le sujet sont impuissants à contrecarrer la meilleure version de cet argument, je formule plusieurs considérations qui concourrent à réduire de beaucoup la force de cet argument. Je conclus en suggérant que ces considérations non seulement réfutent l’argument en faveur de l’absurdité, mais aussi justifient l’agir moral | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | No categories specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,709 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesIsaac Nevo (2006). Is It Wise to Teach Our Students to Follow the Argument Wherever It Leads? Teaching Philosophy 29 (2):157-172.
Uskali Mäki (1994). Methodology Might Matter, but Weintraub's Meta-Methodology Shouldn't. Journal of Economic Methodology 1 (2):215-232.
Michael J. Almeida (2005). Is It Impossible to Be Moral? Dialogue 44 (1):3-13.
Alan Sidelle (1991). Formed Matter Without Objects: A Reply to Denkel. Dialogue 30 (1-2):163-.
David Lumsden (2005). How Can a Symbol System Come Into Being? Dialogue 44 (1):87-96.
Paul Franceschi (1998). Une Solution Pour l'Argument de l'Apocalypse. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (2):227 - 246.
Daniel Brudney (1991). Hypothetical Consent and Moral Force. Law and Philosophy 10 (3):235 - 270.
Kim Sang Ong-Van-Cung (forthcoming). L' « Argument de l'Illusion » Et la Philosophie Cartésienne des Idées. Revue de Métaphysique Et de Morale.
Peter Murphy (2005). A Sceptical Rejoinder to Sensitivity-Contextualism. Dialogue 44 (4):693-706.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads12 ( #93,475 of 549,700 )Recent downloads (6 months)0How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
