Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Review 118 (1):59-85 (2009)
|Abstract||Diachronic Dutch book arguments seem to support both conditionalization and Bas van Fraassen's Reflection principle. But the Reflection principle is vulnerable to numerous counterexamples. This essay addresses two questions: first, under what circumstances should an agent obey Reflection, and second, should the counterexamples to Reflection make us doubt the Dutch book for conditionalization? In response to the first question, this essay formulates a new "Qualified Reflection" principle, which states that an agent should obey Reflection only if he or she is certain that he or she will conditionalize on veridical evidence in the future. Qualified Reflection follows from the probability calculus together with a few idealizing assumptions. The essay then formulates a "Distorted Reflection" principle that approximates Reflection even in cases where the agent is not quite certain that he or she will conditionalize on veridical evidence. In response to the second question, the essay argues that contrary to a common misconception, not all Dutch books dramatize incoherence—some dramatize a less blameworthy sort of epistemic frailty that the essay calls "self-doubt." The distinction between Dutch books that dramatize incoherence and those that dramatize self-doubt cross-cuts the distinction between synchronic and diachronic Dutch books. The essay explains why the Dutch book for conditionalization reveals true incoherence, whereas the Dutch book for Reflection reveals only self-doubt.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Wlodek Rabinowicz (2006). Levi on Money Pumps and Diachronic Dutch Books. In Erik J. Olsson (ed.), Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi. Cambridge University Press.
Daniel Silber (1999). Dutch Books and Agent Rationality. Theory and Decision 47 (3):247-266.
Kevin Scharp (2008). Locke's Theory of Reflection. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16 (1):25 – 63.
Simon J. Evnine (2007). Personhood and Future Belief: Two Arguments for Something Like Reflection. Erkenntnis 67 (1):91 - 110.
Wlodek Rabinowicz & Luc Bovens (2011). Bets on Hats: On Dutch Books Against Groups, Degrees of Belief as Betting Rates, and Group-Reflection. Episteme 8 (3):281-300.
Brad Armendt (1992). Dutch Strategies for Diachronic Rules: When Believers See the Sure Loss Coming. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:217 - 229.
Matthias Hild (1998). The Coherence Argument Against Conditionalization. Synthese 115 (2):229-258.
Patrick Maher (1992). Diachronic Rationality. Philosophy of Science 59 (1):120-141.
Jonathan Weisberg (2007). Conditionalization, Reflection, and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 135 (2):179-97.
Mitchell S. Green & Christopher R. Hitchcock (1994). Reflections on Reflection: Van Fraassen on Belief. Synthese 98 (2):297 - 324.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads208 ( #1,543 of 739,396 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,680 of 739,396 )
How can I increase my downloads?