Experience, reality and conditions for description

Inquiry 11 (1-4):85 – 100 (1968)
This paper deals with the problem of the External World, taking its point of departure in Peter Zinkernagel's Conditions for Description. In the first section I try to give an outline of the theses contained in that book. In the second I raise a main objection against it, pointing out that Zinkernagel, in one respect, has not sufficiently sharpened the argumentation between phenomenalism and realism. In the third section I turn realism and phenomenalism sharply against each other, presenting the latter in a radical, yet consistent form; the section is an attempt to show how phenomenalism can be rejected.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00201746808601521
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 22,660
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

18 ( #226,406 of 1,938,822 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #125,144 of 1,938,822 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.