In computation, parallel is nothing, physical everything

Minds and Machines 11 (1):95-99 (2001)
  Andrew Boucher (1997) argues that ``parallel computation is fundamentally different from sequential computation'' (p. 543), and that this fact provides reason to be skeptical about whether AI can produce a genuinely intelligent machine. But parallelism, as I prove herein, is irrelevant. What Boucher has inadvertently glimpsed is one small part of a mathematical tapestry portraying the simple but undeniable fact that physical computation can be fundamentally different from ordinary, ``textbook'' computation (whether parallel or sequential). This tapestry does indeed immediately imply that human cognition may be uncomputable
Keywords Artificial Intelligence  Computation  Intelligence  Science  Turing Machines  Boucher, A
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DOI 10.1023/A:1011257022242
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