In defense of impenetrable zombies

Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):348-351 (1995)
Moody is right that the doctrine of conscious inessentialism is false. Unfortunately, his zombie-based argument against , once made sufficiently clear to evaluate, is revealed as nothing but legerdemain. The fact is -- though Moody has convinced himself otherwise -- certain zombies are impenetrable: that they are zombies, and not conscious beings like us, is something beyond the capacity of humans to divine
Keywords Consciousness  Essentialism  Metaphysics  Zombie  Moody, T
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