Mind and Morality: An Examination of Hume's Moral Psychology

Oxford University Press (1996)
This book is a penetrating study of the theory of mind and morality that Hume developed in his Treatise of Human Nature and other writings. Hume rejects any conception of moral beliefs and moral truths. He understands morality in terms of distinctive desires and other sentiments that arise through the correction of sympathy. Hume's theory presents a powerful challenge to recent cognitivist theories of moral judgement, Bricke argues, and suggests significant limitations to recent conventionalist and contractarian accounts of morality's content.
Keywords Ethics  Philosophy of mind  Hume
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Call number B1499.E8.B67 1996
ISBN(s) 0198235895   9780198235897  
DOI 10.1086/233841
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David Bain (2013). What Makes Pains Unpleasant? Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.
David Bain & Michael Brady (2014). Pain, Pleasure, and Unpleasure. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):1-14.

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